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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Ocean common carriers transport cargo between 
foreign countries and the United States.  In this case, 
Plaintiffs1 used the services of such carriers to transport 
vehicles.  Some plaintiffs made arrangements with and 
received vehicles directly from the carriers (direct purchaser 
plaintiffs or “DPPs”), while other plaintiffs obtained the 
benefit of the carrier services by ultimately receiving vehicles 
transported from abroad (indirect purchaser plaintiffs or 
“IPPs”).  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, who are ocean 
common carriers, entered into agreements to fix prices and 
reduce capacity in violation of federal antitrust laws and 
various state laws.  Because the ocean common carriers 
allegedly engaged in acts prohibited by the Shipping Act of 
                                              
1 The plaintiffs fall into two categories: Direct 
Purchase Plaintiffs (“DPPs”) and Indirect Purchase Plaintiffs 
(“IPPs”).  The latter category consists of Auto Dealer IPPs, 
End-Payor IPPs, and Truck Center IPPs. 
13 
 
1984, 46 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. (the “Shipping Act” or the 
“Act”), and the Act both precludes private plaintiffs from 
seeking relief under the federal antitrust laws for such 
conduct and preempts the state law claims under 
circumstances like those presented here, the District Court 
correctly dismissed the complaints.  We will therefore affirm.   
 
I2 
 
Defendants transport vehicles from their country of 
origin to the country where they will be sold, including the 
United States, at which point the vehicles are delivered to 
dealers and individuals, such as Auto Dealer IPPs, Truck 
Center IPPs, and End-Payor IPPs.  The vehicle manufacturers 
and DPPs purchase vehicle carrier services from Defendants, 
and the costs of these services are passed on to IPPs.   
 
In September 2012, law enforcement raided 
Defendants’ offices in connection with antitrust 
investigations, and several Defendants thereafter pleaded 
guilty to antitrust violations based on price-fixing, allocating 
customers, and rigging bids for vehicle carrier services to and 
from the United States and elsewhere.   
 
Plaintiffs filed complaints with jury demands alleging 
that Defendants entered into “secret” agreements in 
connection with Defendants’ carriage of vehicles.  These 
                                              
2 Because this appeal arises from an order dismissing 
the complaints pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the facts 
are derived from the complaints and are accepted as true.  
Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
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agreements included: (1) price increase coordination 
agreements; (2) agreements not to compete, including 
coordination of responses to price reduction requests and 
allocation of customers and routes; and (3) agreements to 
restrict capacity by means of agreed-upon fleet reductions.  
Plaintiffs claim they suffered economic injuries as a result of 
these agreements and seek relief under the Clayton Act for 
violations of the Sherman Act.  IPPs also assert state antitrust, 
consumer fraud, and unjust enrichment claims.   
 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaints pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), claiming they are immune from 
antitrust liability under the Shipping Act and that the state law 
claims are preempted.  The District Court agreed and 
dismissed the complaints with prejudice.   
 
 While the motions to dismiss were pending, IPPs 
informed the District Court that they reached a putative class 
action settlement in principle with two groups of defendants, 
“K” Line and MOL Defendants (the “Settling Defendants”), 
but no motions to approve any settlement were filed.  After 
the Court dismissed the complaints, IPPs filed a motion for 
reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) and 
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) alleging that, before the cases were 
dismissed, they had notified the Court that they agreed in 
principle to settle and requested that it retain jurisdiction to 
approve a class settlement.  
 
The District Court denied IPPs’ motion for 
reconsideration because it had determined that the Federal 
Maritime Commission (“FMC”) was the appropriate forum to 
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hear the dispute3 and because IPPs “did not identif[y] an 
intervening change in the controlling law, alert[ ] the Court to 
the availability of new evidence that was not available when 
the Court issued its Opinion, or allege[ ] that the Opinion was 
the result of a clear error of fact or law or will result in 
manifest injustice.”  Joint App. 62-63.   
 
Plaintiffs appeal the order dismissing the complaints 
and IPPs also appeal the order denying reconsideration.4  
                                              
3 While IPPs’ motion for reconsideration was pending, 
Plaintiffs filed complaints with the FMC. 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and we have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of a district 
court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 
(3d Cir. 2011), and apply the same standard as the District 
Court.  See Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John 
Hancock Life Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Under this standard, we must determine whether the 
complaints “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), “but we 
disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.”  James v. 
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012).  Our 
review of the District Court’s order denying IPPs’ motion to 
reconsider is “plenary where the denial was based on the 
‘interpretation and application of a legal precept.’  Otherwise, 
we review such denials for abuse of discretion.”  United 
16 
 
II 
 
 To resolve this appeal, we must first examine the 
Shipping Act of 1984.  Broadly, the Shipping Act establishes 
a uniform federal framework for regulating entities, such as 
ocean common carriers,5 and attempts to place U.S.-flag 
                                                                                                     
States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 713, 716 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted). 
5 Under the Shipping Act, the “term ‘ocean common 
carrier’ means a vessel-operating common carrier.”  46 
U.S.C. § 40102.  Under the Act, a   
 
“common carrier”—(A) means a person that—
(i) holds itself out to the general public to 
provide transportation by water of passengers or 
cargo between the United States and a foreign 
country for compensation; (ii) assumes 
responsibility for the transportation from the 
port or point of receipt to the port or point of 
destination; and (iii) uses, for all or part of that 
transportation, a vessel operating on the high 
seas or the Great Lakes between a port in the 
United States and a port in a foreign country; 
but (B) does not include a carrier engaged in 
ocean transportation by ferry boat, ocean tramp, 
or chemical parcel-tanker, or by vessel when 
primarily engaged in the carriage of perishable 
agricultural commodities—(i) if the carrier and 
the owner of those commodities are wholly-
owned, directly or indirectly, by a person 
primarily engaged in the marketing and 
distribution of those commodities; and (ii) only 
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vessels on a level economic playing field with their foreign 
counterparts.  The Act sets forth four specific purposes: 
 
(1) establish a nondiscriminatory regulatory 
process for the common carriage of goods by 
water in the foreign commerce of the United 
States with a minimum of government 
intervention and regulatory costs; 
(2) provide an efficient and economic 
transportation system in the ocean commerce of 
the United States that is, insofar as possible, in 
harmony with, and responsive to, international 
shipping practices; 
(3) encourage the development of an 
economically sound and efficient liner fleet of 
vessels of the United States capable of meeting 
national security needs; and 
(4) promote the growth and development of 
United States exports through competitive and 
efficient ocean transportation and by placing a 
greater reliance on the marketplace. 
 
46 U.S.C. § 40101.  Taken together, these purposes show that 
the Act seeks to promote economically sound, evenhanded, 
and efficient ocean commerce that responds to international 
shipping practices.  See also Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. 
Harbor v. Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 164 F.3d 177, 
185 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The primary purpose of the Shipping 
                                                                                                     
with respect to the carriage of those 
commodities.   
 
Id. 
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Act . . . is to eliminate discriminatory treatment of shippers 
and carriers.”).   
 
One way the Act sought to achieve these goals was to 
broaden the provisions of the prior law that provided very 
limited antitrust immunity.6  The House Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which reported on the bill, 
noted “[t]he perception . . . that the threat of U.S. antitrust 
prosecution weighs much more heavily on U.S. operators 
than their foreign-flag competition” and recognized “the need 
to foster a regulatory environment in which U.S.-flag liner 
operators are not placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-
vis their foreign-flag competitors.”  Report of the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, H.R. Rep. No. 
98-53(I), 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 9, 10.7  To address this 
                                              
6 The Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., 
provided antitrust immunity for rate-making agreements 
approved by the FMC.  See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pac. 
Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 216-18 & n.1 (1966) (noting 
that the Shipping Act of 1916 included only a limited antitrust 
exemption and holding that the implementation of rate-
making agreements not approved by the FMC was subject to 
the antitrust laws); Nat’l Ass’n of Recycling Indus., Inc. v. 
Am. Mail Line, Ltd., 720 F.2d 618, 618 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(stating that the Shipping Act of 1916 immunized collective 
rate-making activity provided that the rate-making was 
authorized by agreements which the FMC approved and all 
rates were filed with the FMC).   
7 H.R. Rep. No. 98-53 relates to the proposed Shipping 
Act of 1983, S. 504, H.R. 1878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., which 
was not passed but was considered by the same Congress that 
passed the Shipping Act of 1984.  The proposed Shipping Act 
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disadvantage, the Shipping Act “exempt[ed] from the 
antitrust laws those agreements and activities subject to 
regulation by the” FMC.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-53(I), at 3.  Such 
agreements include those that: 
 
(1) discuss, fix, or regulate transportation rates, 
including through rates, cargo space 
accommodations, and other conditions of 
service; 
(2) pool or apportion traffic, revenues, earnings, 
or losses; 
(3) allot ports or regulate the number and 
character of voyages between ports; 
(4) regulate the volume or character of cargo or 
passenger traffic to be carried; 
(5) engage in an exclusive, preferential, or 
cooperative working arrangement between 
themselves or with a marine terminal operator; 
(6) control, regulate, or prevent competition in 
international ocean transportation; or 
(7) discuss and agree on any matter related to a service 
contract. 
 
Id. § 40301.   
 
 The Act provides federal antitrust immunity for 
agreements filed with the FMC that address these topics.8  
                                                                                                     
of 1983 is the same in all relevant respects as the Shipping 
Act of 1984.   
8 46 U.S.C. § 40302 provides that a “true copy of 
every agreement referred to in section 40301(1) or (b) of this 
title shall be filed with the [FMC].  If the agreement is oral, a 
20 
 
The FMC reviews each filed agreement and can seek 
information about it.  46 U.S.C. § 40304.  If the FMC takes 
no action on such an agreement, that agreement becomes 
effective,9 and, pursuant to § 40307(a), the federal antitrust 
laws, such as the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, “do not 
apply to [such] an agreement.”  46 U.S.C. §§ 40102, 
40307(a).  Thus, activities described in § 40301 that are 
undertaken pursuant to agreements filed with the FMC are 
immune from federal antitrust laws.   
 
 The Act also provides immunity from private antitrust 
suits based on conduct prohibited by the Act.  For example, 
the Act prohibits conduct undertaken pursuant to agreements 
                                                                                                     
complete memorandum specifying in detail the substance of 
the agreement shall be filed.” 
9 Under the Shipping Act, an agreement is effective: 
  
(1) on the 45th day after filing, or on the 30th 
day after notice of the filing is published in the 
Federal Register, whichever is later; or 
(2) if additional information or documents are 
requested under subsection (d)—(A) on the 45th 
day after the Commission receives all the 
additional information and documents; or (B) if 
the request is not fully complied with, on the 
45th day after the Commission receives the 
information and documents submitted and a 
statement of the reasons for noncompliance 
with the request. 
 
46 U.S.C. § 40304. 
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that are not effective or have been rejected.  Specifically, 
§ 41102(b) provides: 
 
Operating contrary to agreement.—A person 
may not operate under an agreement required to 
be filed under section 40302 or 40305 of this 
title if— 
(1) the agreement has not become effective 
under section 40304 of this title or has been 
rejected, disapproved, or canceled; or  
(2) the operation is not in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement or any 
modifications to the agreement made by the 
Federal Maritime Commission. 
 
46 U.S.C. § 41102(b).  If an agreement has not been filed, it 
cannot become effective and thus operating under such an 
unfiled agreement is prohibited.  See 46 C.F.R. § 535.901 
(“Any person operating under an agreement . . . that has not 
been filed and that has not become effective pursuant to the 
Act . . . is in violation of the Act . . . .”).  A party injured by 
activities occurring under such an unfiled, and hence not 
effective, agreement may not obtain Clayton Act relief.  Id. § 
40307(d) (stating that “[a] person may not recover damages 
under section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15), or obtain 
injunctive relief under section 16 of that Act (15 U.S.C. 26), 
for conduct prohibited by” the Shipping Act); see also H.R. 
Rep. No. 98-53(I), at 12 (“The antitrust exposure for these so-
called ‘secret’ agreements is limited to injunctive and 
criminal prosecution by the Attorney General, and does not 
carry with it any private right of action otherwise available 
under the antitrust laws.”). 
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 Although the Act bars private federal antitrust lawsuits 
based on such prohibited conduct, it does provide an avenue 
for relief before the FMC.  A & E Pac. Constr. Co. v. Saipan 
Stevedore Co., 888 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1989).  Either on a 
complaint filed by a private party, 46 U.S.C. § 41301(a), or 
its own motion, the FMC may investigate alleged violations 
of the Shipping Act, id. § 41302.  In such proceedings, the 
parties may engage in discovery, id. § 41303, and request 
hearings before the FMC, id. § 41304.  If a plaintiff shows the 
Act has been violated, the FMC may assess penalties, id. 
§ 41109(a), award damages of up to double the amount of the 
actual injury, grant attorneys’ fees, id. § 41305, and provide a 
means to obtain equitable relief, id. § 41307.10  A & E Pac. 
Constr. Co., 888 F.2d at 71 (noting that “while no private 
party may sue for damages or for injunctive relief under the 
antitrust laws for conduct falling within the purview of the 
[Shipping] Act, the FMC is empowered to order reparations, 
including double damages, to impose sanctions and penalties 
for prohibited conduct, and to file suit in federal district court 
against the offending party” (citations omitted)); see also Fed. 
Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 759 
(2002) (“[T]he similarities between FMC proceedings and 
civil litigation are overwhelming.”).  Congress gave the FMC 
this broad authority to, among other things, “provide a 
deterrent effect which has previously been available only by 
invoking the antitrust laws,” H.R. Rep. No. 98-53(I), at 4, and 
“end the uncertainty and delay that surrounds U.S. 
Government regulation of ocean liner shipping, by providing 
                                              
10 After filing a complaint, a private party may also file 
a complaint in a district court for injunctive relief, id. § 
41306, and seek enforcement of FMC orders in a district 
court, id. § 41309.   
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a predictable legal regime and streamlined regulatory process 
administered and enforced by a single independent Federal 
agency (the [FMC]) to better serve the needs of U.S. foreign 
commerce,” Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, S. Rep. No. 98-3, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess. at 1.11  See also H.R. Rep. No. 98-53(I), at 12 
(“[T]he remedies and sanctions provided in the Shipping Act . 
. . will be the exclusive remedies and sanctions for violation 
of the Act.”); Seawinds Ltd. v. Nedlloyd Lines, B.V., 80 B.R. 
181, 184, 185 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that, “[b]y removing 
the courts from this regulatory process, Congress removed the 
potential for continuing regulatory uncertainty” under the 
antitrust laws), aff’d, 846 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 
 Thus, the Shipping Act’s text, scheme, and legislative 
history demonstrate Congress’s intent to create a 
comprehensive, predictable federal framework to ensure 
efficient and nondiscriminatory international shipping 
practices. 
 
III 
 
 Mindful of this framework, we will first address 
whether the Shipping Act bars Plaintiffs’ Clayton Act claims.  
There is no dispute that operating under unfiled price fixing 
and/or market allocation agreements is prohibited under 
§§ 40301 and 40302 of the Shipping Act.   
 
                                              
11 Like H. Rep. 98-53 discussed above, supra note 7, S. 
Rep. No. 98-3 relates to the proposed but not passed Shipping 
Act of 1983, which is the same as the Shipping Act of 1984 in 
all relevant respects.   
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 Plaintiffs assert, however, that the Shipping Act does 
not prohibit a carrier from operating under unfiled agreements 
to restrict capacity.  For support, they point to a statement by 
an FMC Commissioner made at a trade symposium during 
which he said that agreements to restrict capacity “would be 
outside of the Shipping Act purview.”  DPP Appellants’ Br. 
24.  Plaintiffs assert that we should treat this comment as the 
agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers.  This 
argument fails for several reasons.  First, the Commissioner 
stated that “[m]y remarks today reflect my personal views and 
thoughts and are not offered as the official position of the 
United States or the Federal Maritime Commission.”  Joint 
App. 39-40.  Second, and relatedly, Chevron deference only 
applies to agency action, and by his own statements the 
Commissioner acknowledged that he was not speaking or 
acting for the agency.  Thus, Chevron deference is not 
applicable.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Br. for Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n and United States as Amici Curiae 16 n.22. 
 
 Moreover, the Commissioner’s statement is 
undermined by the Act itself.  Sections 40301(a)(3) and (4) 
require parties to file agreements that restrict capacity.  For 
example, § 40301(a)(4) requires carriers to file agreements 
that “regulate the volume or character of cargo or passenger 
traffic to be carried.”  Relatedly, § 40301(a)(3) requires 
carriers to file agreements that “regulate the number and 
character of voyages between ports.”  Entering agreements 
concerning these activities without filing them is prohibited.  
 
  Plaintiffs allege they were injured by acts taken 
pursuant to these unfiled, and thus prohibited, agreements and 
seek damages under the Clayton Act.  The Shipping Act, 
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however, bars them from obtaining Clayton Act relief.  Id. 
§ 40307(d); see Seawinds, 80 B.R. at 183 (“The Shipping Act 
of 1984 expressly bars private antitrust suits based on conduct 
prohibited by the Act.”).  As explained above, the Shipping 
Act specifically provides that operating under an unfiled, and 
hence ineffective, agreement is a prohibited act, id. §  
41102(b), and those injured by such a prohibited act cannot 
obtain Clayton Act relief, id. § 40307(d). 
 
 Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that Clayton Act immunity 
set forth in § 40307(a) must be read in light of § 40307(d) and 
suggest that the two provisions cover the same subjects.  They 
are mistaken.  In § 40307(a), Congress granted immunity 
from antitrust prosecution for conduct permitted by the 
Shipping Act, while in § 40307(d) Congress provided 
immunity from private Clayton Act liability for conduct 
prohibited by the Shipping Act.  Plaintiffs’ reading destroys 
this carefully drawn delineation.   
 
 For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs cannot obtain 
Clayton Act relief, and the District Court correctly dismissed 
Plaintiffs’ Clayton Act claims.12 
                                              
12 Plaintiffs alternatively argue that the complaints 
should not be dismissed with respect to contracts for the 
shipping of “new[ly] assembled motor vehicles.”  46 U.S.C. 
§ 40502.  They raised this argument for the first time during 
oral argument before the District Court, and when the District 
Court confronted them with the fact that this was a new 
argument, they agreed not to “make those arguments.”  Defs. 
App. 141.  Despite this statement, Plaintiffs argue that they 
did not waive the argument because it is currently pending 
before the District Court in a different case.  Raising the 
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IV 
 
 We next examine whether the District Court correctly 
concluded that IPPs’ state law antitrust, consumer protection, 
and unjust enrichment claims are preempted.   
 
A 
 
The preemption doctrine is based on the Supremacy 
Clause, which provides that “the Laws of the United States . . 
. shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Congress thus 
                                                                                                     
argument in another case does not cure their failure to raise 
the argument here, and this failure waives the argument.  
Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of 
Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991).     
Even if the argument were not waived, it would not 
change the outcome.  Section 40502 provides that the 
requirement to file a service contract with the FMC does not 
apply to contracts regarding “new[ly] assembled motor 
vehicles.”  46 U.S.C. § 40502(b) (“Each service contract 
entered into under this section by an individual ocean 
common carrier or an agreement shall be filed confidentially 
with the Federal Maritime Commission. . . .  [This provision] 
does not apply to contracts regarding . . . new assembled 
motor vehicles.”).  This exemption from filing service 
contracts for newly assembled motor vehicles, however, does 
not relieve Defendants from their obligation to file the other 
agreements referred to in § 40301(a) or (b) with the FMC.   
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has the power to preempt state law.  Arizona v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (citation omitted).   
 
Preemption is an affirmative defense, In re Asbestos 
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2016), and so we examine only the defense asserted before 
us, see Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595, 
1602 (2015).  Defendants argue that IPPs’ state law claims 
are subject to conflict preemption.13  There are two types of 
conflict preemption: (1) where “compliance with both federal 
and state duties is simply impossible,” and (2) where 
“compliance with both laws is possible, yet state law poses an 
obstacle to the full achievement of federal purposes.”  MD 
Mall Assocs. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 479, 495 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Defendants rely on “obstacle” conflict preemption.  
Thus, we will examine whether IPPs’ state law claims pose an 
obstacle to achieving Congress’s goals under the Shipping 
Act.  
 
B 
 
1 
 
 We recognize that “all preemption cases ‘start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by [a] [f]ederal [a]ct unless that was the 
                                              
13 Although the Shipping Act contains no express 
preemption clause or savings clause, that does not “‘bar[ ] the 
ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’”  
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 
(2001) (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 
861, 869 (2000)).   
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clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”  Sikkelee v. 
Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 687 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)), cert. 
denied sub nom. Avco Corp. v. Sikkelee, --- S. Ct. ----, 2016 
WL 4944476 (Nov. 28, 2016).14  From this assumption, we 
presume claims based on laws embodying state police powers 
are not preempted.  This “presumption against preemption,” 
however, does not apply here because our case concerns the 
regulation of international maritime commerce, an area 
uniquely in the federal domain.  United States v. Locke, 529 
U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“The state laws now in question bear 
upon national and international maritime commerce, and in 
this area there is no beginning assumption that concurrent 
regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police 
powers.”); see also Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 116 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“The presumption applies with particular force in 
fields within the police powers of the state, but does not apply 
where state regulation has traditionally been absent.” (citation 
omitted)).15 
 
 
 
                                              
14 This assumption is invoked “because respect for the 
States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system’ leads 
us to assume that ‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt 
state-law causes of action.’”  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 n.3 
(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).   
15 Even if the presumption did apply, the text, 
purposes, scheme, and legislative history of the Shipping Act 
embody a “clear and manifest” congressional intention to 
preempt the state laws in question.  See Farina, 625 F.3d at 
117 (citation omitted). 
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2 
 
 As there is no presumption against preemption in this 
case dealing with maritime conduct, we will determine 
whether the Shipping Act preempts IPPs’ state law claims.  
This requires us to consider Congress’s intent.  Mabey Bridge 
& Shore, Inc. v. Schoch, 666 F.3d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 2012); 
see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565.  To do so, we consider the 
language, structure, and purpose of the statute, as well as 
legislative history where appropriate.  See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d 
at 687; Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 243-44 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  
 
 As noted previously, one purpose of the Act is to 
“establish a nondiscriminatory regulatory process for the 
common carriage of goods by water in the foreign commerce 
of the United States with a minimum of government 
intervention and regulatory costs.”  46 U.S.C. § 40101(1).  A 
second purpose is to ensure that U.S.-flag ships are on a level 
playing field with foreign vessels.  See, e.g., id. § 40101(2) 
(stating that a purpose of the Act is to provide an efficient 
system of ocean transportation that is “in harmony with, and 
responsive to, international shipping practices”).      
 
 To those ends, the Act granted ocean common carriers 
certain antitrust immunities.  Section 40307(a) expressly 
immunizes agreements filed with the FMC from the federal 
criminal and civil antitrust laws, and § 40307(d) bars 
recovery of damages and injunctions under the Clayton Act 
for conduct prohibited by the Act.  Through these provisions, 
Congress sought to limit the application of the antitrust laws 
to enable U.S.-flag carriers to compete against their foreign 
counterparts who may not be subject to similar restrictions.  
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See H.R. Rep. No. 98-53(I), at 9, 10 (noting “[t]he perception 
. . . that the threat of U.S. antitrust prosecution weighs much 
more heavily on U.S. operators than their foreign-flag 
competition” and recognizing a “need to foster a regulatory 
environment in which U.S.-flag liner operators are not placed 
at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign-flag 
competitors”); S. Rep. No. 98-3, at 7 (noting trading partners’ 
“blocking statutes” and stating that “[c]lear antitrust 
immunity . . . marks a major step in revitalizing our maritime 
industry because it removes a major handicap created by 
uneven enforcement”); see also S. Rep. No. 98-3, at 1 
(recommending the bill “in order to . . . harmonize U.S. 
shipping practices with those of our major trading partners, 
especially by reaffirming antitrust immunity for certain 
carrier and conference activities”).  To allow state antitrust 
claims to proceed would interfere with this goal.  See Am. 
Ass’n of Cruise Passengers, Inc. v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc., 911 F.2d 786, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Congress was 
concerned about a carrier being subject to ‘parallel 
jurisdiction,’ i.e., remedies and sanctions for the same 
conduct made unlawful by both the Shipping Act and the 
antitrust laws.” (emphasis and citation omitted)); H.R. Rep. 
No. 98-53(I), at 12 (reflecting Congress’s intent “that 
violations of this Act not result in the creation of parallel 
jurisdiction over persons or matters which are subject to the 
Shipping Act”).  Put simply, to subject the carriers to 
potential state antitrust liability would essentially undo 
Congress’s work in expanding antitrust immunity and 
undermine its efforts to assist U.S.-flag ships avoid a 
competitive disadvantage.  See H.R. Rep. No. 98-53(I), at 25 
(noting that the Act would meet the objective to keep ocean 
liners “free of . . . threatened penalties under changing 
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interpretations of the antitrust laws”).  Thus, we hold that the 
Shipping Act preempts IPPs’ state law antitrust claims. 
 
 IPPs’ consumer protection and unjust enrichment 
claims are also preempted.  While these state laws reflect the 
exercise of traditional police powers, applying them here 
would allow the States to impose rules in an area Congress 
has historically regulated: maritime commerce.  Locke, 529 
U.S. at 108.  It would also thwart Congress’s goal of ensuring 
uniform regulation of ocean common carriers’ business 
practices.16  See 46 U.S.C. § 40101(1)-(2); Report of the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, S. Rep. No. 98-3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 
(supporting the bill to end, among other things, “the 
uncertainty and delay that surrounds U.S. Government 
regulation of ocean liner shipping, by providing a predictable 
legal regime and streamlined regulatory process administered 
and enforced by a single independent Federal agency (the 
[FMC])”). 
 
 To achieve these goals, Congress prohibited certain 
activities.  Among other things, the Shipping Act makes 
certain unfair devices unlawful, such as operating under 
unfiled and ineffective agreements on specific matters, id. 
§ 41102(b), failing to establish just and reasonable regulations 
                                              
16 This is not to say that all conduct in which ocean 
common carriers engage is never subject to state law.  See, 
e.g., Pasha Auto Warehousing, Inc. v. Phila. Reg’l Port Auth., 
No. CIV. A. 96-6779, 1998 WL 188848, at *6-9 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 21, 1998) (concluding that the FMC did not have 
exclusive or primary jurisdiction over declaratory relief action 
concerning lease agreements). 
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and practices regarding receiving, handling, storing, or 
delivering property, id. § 41102(c), unreasonably refusing to 
deal or negotiate, id. §§ 41104(10), 41105, and allocating 
shippers in an unauthorized manner among specific carriers 
who were parties to an agreement, id. § 41105.   
 
 In addition to prohibiting such acts, Congress created 
specific enforcement mechanisms for persons and entities 
injured by these illegal practices.  It empowered the FMC to 
investigate and punish illegal conduct pursuant to a uniform 
regime.  By granting the FMC this authority, Congress has 
put in place a regulator familiar with complex foreign 
commerce issues confronting ocean common carriers.  This 
expertise enables the FMC to make informed decisions about 
whether conduct violates the Act and warrants punishment.17  
See Farina, 625 F.3d at 126; 46 U.S.C. §§ 41109, 41305.   
                                              
17 At least where the subject matter is technical and the 
history and background are complex and extensive, we give 
some deference to an agency’s explanation of how state law 
affects the federal scheme.  See Farina, 625 F.3d at 126-27.  
The weight accorded to “the agency’s explanation of state 
law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its 
thoroughness, consistency, and pervasiveness.”  Wyeth, 555 
U.S. at 577 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 234-35 (2001), and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944)).  Here, the FMC and United States, as amici, 
assert that IPPs’ state law antitrust claims are not preempted 
(but appear to take no position with respect to IPPs’ other 
state law claims).  We decline to defer to their views on 
preemption in this case.  First, they discuss field preemption 
but, as stated above, that is not the preemption defense 
asserted before us.  Second, to the extent amici seek to draw a 
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 Moreover, Congress provided a means for private 
parties injured by the illegal acts of such carriers to seek relief 
ranging from double damages and attorneys’ fees to 
injunctions.  Allowing state laws to impose different 
standards would upset this carefully crafted scheme.18  See 
                                                                                                     
distinction between filed and unfiled agreements, we need not 
address that distinction because only unfiled agreements are 
at issue here.  Finally, the FMC’s and United States’ position 
on conflict preemption is not “persuasive[ ].”  See Wyeth, 
555 U.S. at 577.  We recognize, as they assert, that the 
Shipping Act and its legislative history are silent regarding 
state law claims.  However, the position that the Shipping Act 
contemplates state law antitrust enforcement is inconsistent 
with the conclusion that the Shipping Act bars Clayton Act 
claims (with which amici agree); it also overlooks the 
purposes of the Act as set forth in the statute and legislative 
history as well as the comprehensive scheme for enforcement 
of Shipping Act violations before the FMC. 
18 We have observed that situations in which the 
federal government “is required to strike a balance between 
competing statutory objectives lend themselves to a finding of 
conflict preemption.”  Farina, 625 F.3d at 123; see also 
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348 (“The conflict stems from the fact 
that the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to 
punish and deter fraud against the [FDA], and that this 
authority is used by the [FDA] to achieve a somewhat 
delicate balance of statutory objectives.  The balance sought 
by the [FDA] can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA 
claims under state tort law.”); City of Burbank v. Lockheed 
Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1973) (“The Federal 
Aviation Act requires a delicate balance between safety and 
efficiency, and the protection of persons on the ground.  . . .  
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Farina, 625 F.3d at 123 (“Allowing state law to impose a 
different standard permits a re-balancing of those 
considerations.”); cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal 
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (“The balance sought by 
the Administration can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-
FDA claims under state tort law.”).  Further, allowing juries 
to decide liability, as IPPs seek, would conflict with the 
scheme that vests the FMC with decision-making power.  See 
Farina, 625 F.3d at 125 (“Allowing juries to impose liability 
on cell phone companies for claims like Farina’s would 
conflict with the FCC’s regulations.”).  For these reasons, 
permitting IPPs to pursue their state law claims that 
Defendants allegedly had secret agreements to coordinate 
price increases, not to compete, and to restrict capacity would 
interfere with Congress’s goal of uniform regulation of 
common carriers’ international maritime activity.  See 46 
U.S.C. § 40101(1)-(2).  
 
 Accordingly, we hold that the Shipping Act preempts 
IPPs’ state law consumer protection and unjust enrichment 
claims because allowing them to proceed would pose an 
obstacle to achieving Congress’s objectives in passing the 
Act. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
The interdependence of these factors requires a uniform and 
exclusive system of federal regulation if the congressional 
objectives underlying the Federal Aviation Act are to be 
fulfilled.” (citation omitted)).  This case presents such a 
situation.   
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V 
 
IPPs’ challenge to the District Court’s order denying 
their request that it reconsider the dismissal order also fails.  
A judgment may be altered under Rule 59(e) if the party 
seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following: 
“(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the 
availability of new evidence that was not available when the 
court granted the motion . . . ; or (3) the need to correct a 
clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”  
Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 
F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Similarly, Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant 
part, relief from a judgment for: (1) “mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); (2) a 
“judgment [that] is void,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); or (3) 
“any other reason that justifies relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(6). 
 
IPPs asked the District Court to reconsider its 
dismissal order and “retain jurisdiction over claims asserted 
against K Line and MOL [Defendants] for the limited 
purpose” of approving class action settlements.  Joint App. 
60.   However, IPPs did not submit a motion for preliminary 
and final approval of any settlement or a motion to stay the 
matter before the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims.  
Furthermore, IPPs did not identify an intervening change in 
the controlling law, present new evidence, allege that the 
District Court’s opinion was the result of a clear error of fact 
or law, or point to any extraordinary circumstance that would 
warrant granting relief.  Because IPPs failed to meet any of 
the grounds for reconsideration, the District Court did not 
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abuse its discretion in denying their motions for 
reconsideration.19   
 
VI 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                              
19 IPPs argue that the District Court “erred in 
concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
effectuate settlements with the two largest defendants.”  IPP 
Appellants’ Br. 44.  The Court did not deny IPPs’ motions for 
reconsideration on the basis of a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Indeed, it was aware that it possessed subject 
matter jurisdiction over the dispute and exercised its 
discretion not to entertain the request to approve the 
settlements because it had determined that the FMC provided 
a forum to resolve Plaintiffs’ dispute.   
